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A Proposition With a Powerful Punch: The Legality
and Constitutionality of NCAA Proposition 48
Kevin M. McKenna*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hey, fine, you are great athletes, but if you want to go to a quality
school and you want to compete, you are going to have to start to
read a book; you are going to have to write, you are going to have
to do things that you are not comfortable with.' Joseph V. Paterno,
head football coach, Pennsylvania State University.
The course of action before the delegates of the 1983 National
Collegiate Athletic Association Convention 2 was, in not so eloquent
* B.A., 1983, Villanova University; J.D., 1986, Villanova University School
of Law. Former law clerk for the honorable Randy J. Holland of the Supreme
Court of Delaware. Currently the Assistant City Solicitor for Philadelphia. The
author was a member of the Villanova basketball team from 1979-1983. Publications
include an article in the St. Louis University Law Journal entitled "Age Limitations
and the NCAA: Discrimination or Equating Competition?" and the co-author of
"Drug Testing in Sports" which appears in the current issue of the Dickenson Law
Review. The author would like to thank research assistasnt Mary Rose McCarthy
and Mary Kris Pritchett for their assistance in preparing the manuscript. The author
is also grateful to Bruce Rodgers, J.D., for his editorial comments.
1. See NCAA, Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 116 (1983) [hereinafter NCAA Proceedings (1983)].
2.
[The] National Collegiate Athletic Association [hereinafter "NCAA"] is a
private non-profit association organized in 1905. [The] NCAA consists of
approximately 900 members. Membership is open to four-year institutions
which meet certain academic standards. Allied and Associate membership is
open to athletic conferences, associations, and other groups interested in
intercollegiate athletics .... [The] NCAA operates pursuant to a constitution
and bylaws adopted by the membership and subject to amendment, . . . by
the membership at annual conventions. When the annual convention is not in
session, policy is established and directed by the NCAA Council of 22 members
elected by the entire membership at the annual convention. [The] NCAA has
a professional staff located at its headquarters in Shawnee Mission, Kansas.
Some 80 employees execute NCAA policy under the supervision of [an
executive director].
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546
F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part,
707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 463 U.S. 1311. The NCAA's Consti-
tution, bylaws,and procedures are set out at length in its manual, National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 1982-1983 NCAA Manual [hereinafter cited as NCAA Manual].
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terms, simple: either put up or shut up.' Close to 100 Division I
college presidents and chancellors-something unprecedented in re-
cent NCAA history-were in attendance. Issues relating to academic
standards were the primary reason most of these presidents and
chancellors were present.4 And, as Lattie Coor of the University of
Vermont urged, the time was now or never.
If we fail to act on these issues today, we will state more profoundly
than ever before to the public and to all who have an interest in
intercollegiate athletics that we cannot and will not take a step to
insist that athletes must be students before they can be intercollegiate
athletes.5
Having averted their eyes from the exploitation of athletes for
years, this gathering of university presidents and chancellors finally
decided that they had seen enough.6 Proposition 48, which requires
incoming freshman student-athletes to have at least a 2.0 high school
grade point average and a 700 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test in
order to be eligible to compete in intercollegiate sports during their
first years, was ratified by the Convention.
7
The results have had measurable impact. To wit, as of August 8,
1986, the following:
Three hundred and ninety-seven (397) athletes who were awarded
scholarships were ineligible to compete their freshmen seasons.
Fourteen of the 47 players on the Parade magazine All-America
football team were ineligible. 9
Fifteen of the nation's top 50 basketball players were ineligible.10
Ten of Oklahoma University's 23 football recruits were ineligible."
The University of Cincinnati lost the services of six of its basketball
recruits.12
3. See NCAA Proceedings (1983), supra note 1, at 119.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. In the words of Dr. Harry Edwards, who teaches the Sociology of
Sports at Cal-Burkley, "There are thousands of athletes being passed through college
without regard for academic progress. That is exploitation, not assistance." Mulligan,
Sudden Impact, Grades In on Proposition 48, 397 Athletes Affected So Far,
Philadelphia Daily News. Aug. 12, 1986, at 77, Col. 1.
7. See NCAA Proceedings (1983), supra note 1, at 119.
8. See Mulligan, supra note 8, at 78, Col. 1. Id. This figure includes 224
football players, 120 basketball players and 53 who played other sports. Id.







Football teams in the Southeastern Conference lost a total of 23
players to ineligibility;
13
Notre Dame lost three football players 4 and one basketball player,
15
Austin Peay lost three football players and four basketball players.
6
Two of the finest high school basketball players in the Philadelphia
area, both of them bound for Big 5 schools, did not play as freshmen. 
17
Despite the adoption of Proposition 48, two questions persist. First,
does it actually discriminate against minorities and others from poor
socio-economical backgrounds? Second, given the number of athletes
sidelined by Proposition 48, why have none of them challenged its
legality?
II. THE BYLAW
In January, 1983, the Division I schools of the NCAA promulgated
Proposition 48, NCAA 5-1-(j) (hereinafter "Bylaw"). 8 The Bylaw
provides:
Effective August 1, 1986, in order to be eligible for practice, partici-
pation in regular-season competition and athletically related financial
aid during the first academic year in residence, a student entering a
Division I NCAA member institution directly out of high school must
have:
(i) Graduated from high school with a minimum grade-point average
of 2.000 (based on a maximum of 4.000) in a core curriculum of at
least 11 academic full-year courses, including at least three in English,
two in mathematics, two in social science and two in natural or
physical science (including at least one laboratory class, if offered by
the high school) as well as a 700 combined score on the SAT verbal
and math sections or a 15 composite score on the ACT, or;
(ii) Presented more than the minimum standard set forth in the
preceding paragraph for either the core-curriculum grade-point average
or required test score, in which case eligibility may be established
during the specified time periods on the basis of the following eligibility
indices:
For those freshmen entering subsequent to August 1, 1986 and prior
to August 1, 1987:
13. Id. Similarly, Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference teams lost 27.
14. Id.
15. Id. Keith Robinson of Buffalo did not qualify. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Ivan Brown from Monsignor Bonner in Drexel Hill, PA sat out at
St. Joseph's University while Roman Catholic's Earnest Pollard did the same at
Temple University. Id.
18. See NCAA Proceedings (1983), supra note 1, at 124.
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The intent of the Bylaw was two-fold. In the words of Southern
Methodist University's Donald Shields:
We have the opportunity to say to our potential student-athletes,
secondary school districts and their leadership that beginning in the
fall of 1986, we expect our competing student-athletes to be able to
demonstrate basic minimum academic competencies as evidenced first
by satisfactory completion of a very modest and yet well-balanced
high school core-curriculum and, secondly, by reasonable, minimum
performance standards in essential verbal and mathematics skills on
nationally administered examinations. 20
A closer look at the record of the Convention Proceeding con-
cerning the debate over the proposed adoption of the Bylaw reveals
that discussions only vaguely related to raising academic standards
for the student-athlete. 21 The debate actually centered on whether the
Bylaw (then designated as Proposal No. 48) discriminated against
traditionally black institutions.
19. See NCAA, NCAA Guide for the College-Bound Student Athlete, Feb-
ruary 1986, at 14. According to The Guide's introduction:
The information contained in this publication is designed to provide a general
summary of NCAA rules and regulations in easy-to-read form to prospective
student-athletes, high school and junior college officials, representatives of
NCAA member institutions, and other interested individuals. These guidelines
relate primarily to the recruiting and eligibility of prospective student- athletes
as well as to the financial aid they are permitted to receive. Please note that
these rules do not apply to an individual's eligibility for high school or junior
college participation. Id.
20. NCAA Proceedings (1983), supra note 1, at 103. Shields also stated:
It seems clear to many of us that in these days of increasing national concerns
about inadequate academic standards in our secondary schools and colleges
that this legislation is not only appropriate but indeed is necessary to preserve
the organizational integrity of the NCAA as well as the institutional integrity
of our member institutions.
Id.
Ironically, Shields represented a school which approximately four years later
became the first institution to receive the "Death Penalty" from the NCAA as part
of sanctions imposed for improprieties relating to its football program. Moore,
SMU Football Program Is Sentenced to 'Death'. Wilmington News Journal, Feb.
28, 1987, p. CL1, at 2-3.
21. See NCAA Proceedings (1983), supra note 1.
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As might be expected, the representatives from the predominately
black colleges and universities opposed the Bylaw.22 According to
Grambling State University's Joseph B. Johnson,23 "the alleged aca-
demicians who formulated this proposal which 'sought' to determine
the fate of so many student-athletes eliminated a very important
segment of Division I historically black institutions." 24 Johnson ex-
plained that the American Council on Education (ACE) failed to
conduct an impact study of the potential effect of the proposed
changes on Blacks and other minority athletes.2z In addition, Johnson
stated:
The committee's proposal, ladies and gentlemen, discriminates against
student-athletes from low-income and minority-group families by in-
troducing arbitrary SAT and ACT cutoff scores as academic criteria
for eligibility. The ACE committee's proposal is based upon academic
conjecture rather than empirical data. I asked the question and no
one answered: "Why are we not setting standards for all of the NCAA
instead of just Division I?
' '26
This question was echoed by Frederick S. Humphries of Tennessee
State University.27 According to Humphries
If the urgency to address the academic issue is one that is felt among
Division I institutions and not among Division II and III institutions,
as we seem to be indicating in this Convention today, then cannot
that logic be further extrapolated to say only among some institutions
of Division I? And if it is an urgency for some institutions in Division
22. Id. For example, representatives from Delaware State University, Gram-
bling State University, North Carolina A & T, Southern University and Tennessee
State University all addressed the convention in opposition to the Bylaw. Id.
23. Id. at 103. Johnson also represented the Southwestern Athletic Conference
and the National Association of Equal Opportunity in Higher Educatioon. Id.
24. The "alleged academicians" Johnson referred to were members of the
Ad Hoc Committee of the American Council on Education. Id. at 104. In Johnson's
opinion, the Ad Hoc Committee was also "seeking to infringe upon the eminent
domain of college and university presidents as well as the hallowed provines of
colleges and universities board of trustees, regents and school systems." Id.
25. Id. According to Johnson, the ACE proposal put the blame on the victim
in that it shifted the total responsibility for academic success to the student athlete
rather than the institution. Id.
26. Id. Johnson relinquished the floor answering the question with one of
his own. Johnson stated: "The question has not been answered. I leave this thought
to you, those of you who did not answer. 'They came after the Jews and I said
nothing; they came after the Catholics and I said nothing; they came after the
Blacks and I said nothing. Then they came after me and there was no one there to
say anything."'
Id. at 104-05.
27. Id. at 110-11.
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I, is it not then fair to say that that urgency be addressed by those
institutions who are so involved rather than the application of ine-
quality that we who work in higher education would never allow in
any other aspect of our institutional life?
28
Jesse N. Stone, Jr. of Southern University also spoke out against
the Bylaw.29 In his address to the Convention, Stone stressed that
everyone present supported strongly and believed in excellence in
education as well as academics. 30 However, Stone felt that this
excellence should not be achieved with one sweeping piece of legis-
lation thereby depriving minority athletes of the chance to compete
both academically and athletically.3 Stone stated:
I stand here today out of a deep concern for those athletes who are
not present and who are not participating in athletics today whose
faces are clear to me and whose race is therefore known. I am speaking
of that body of highly talented athletes who want the opportunities
to display their talents as they seek the opportunity for higher edu-
cation. They are asking, I. think, not to be cut off.32
28. Id. at 111. Humphries pointed out that a principle of inequity exists in
the NCAA. Id. In support of his position, Humphries noted the adoption of
Proposition No. 20, which was tailored for each of the I-A football-playing con-
ferences. Id. This raises a poignant question. If the member institutions of the
NCAA are unequal under certain circumstances, why should they be equal in all
other aspects of the NCAA?
29. Id. at 107.
30. Id. Stone added:
I suppose that if at Southern University we believed that we needed to raise
our standards so that the athlete who came to Southern University would
have more done for him then we would do it, whether you did it at the other
institutions or not. I want to emphasize with that statement the fact that
institutions are, in fact, free, if I read the rules correctly, to raise their
standards beyond that which is required for NCAA competition.
Id.
31. Id. James A. Castaneda of Rice University offered a different interpre-
tation. Castaneda stated: "It seems to me that the protective stance adopted in the
name of minorities could in the long run be prejudicial to those very minorities."
Id. at 106.
32. Id. As James H. Zumberge of the University of Southern California
explained:
The preeminence of academics over athletics has been emphasized by the
NCAA through constant use of the term student-athlete. This name tradition-
ally has been used to designate those students who are awarded grants-in-aid
as a means of acquiring the college education while at the same time repre-
senting a member institution in intercollegiate athletic events. Over the years,
the athletic grant-in-aid program administered by the NCAA has opened a
door to a college education for thousands of individuals who otherwise would




In support of his position, Stone reminded his colleagues what Arnold
Palmer, on hand to receive an award, had said to the Convention
one day earlier.3 3 Palmer, a golf legend, had admitted to the Con-
vention that he had not been the best student at Wake Forest but
that next to his parents, his alma mater had the greatest influence
on him.
34
To many, there was no substantive basis or substantive data to
support the adoption of the Bylaw as criterion which would enhance
the academic achievement or the academic assuredness or program
toward a degree by the activities that were specified.
3 5
In fact, the presidents of traditionally black institutions took
particular exception to the SAT score as part of the eligibility
requirements.36 For example, Luna I. Mishoe of Delaware State
College said that the SAT arbitrarily penalizes a large number of
students, minorities and non-minorities alike, simply on the basis of
socioeconomic background. 37 In support of his position, Mishoe
explained:
Students of low socioeconomic backgrounds score 100 points less than
other students, and this has nothing to do with intellectual retention
to do college work. It is based on external factors. We feel that those
students, minorities and nonminorities, should not be penalized for
those external reasons.
38
According to Edward B. Fort of Noith Carolina A & T State
University, hundreds, if not thousands of youths, including black
and rural isolated white youths have been excluded from an oppor-
tunity to participate in Division I sports because of the SAT.39 He
33. Id. at 108.
34. Id. According to Stone,
[Palmer] gave Wake Forest the major portion of the credit for his success. I,
for one, do not know a lot about Arnold Palmer; but I am glad that Wake
Forest didn't test him out before he had an opportunity to demonstrate the
kind of professional that he could become. That is all I am asking you to do
here today, not to test out and not to wash out and not to deny the
opportunities to these young men and young women that our nation so long
ago promised.
Id.
35. NCAA Proceeding (1983), supra note 1, at 108-11.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 110.
38. Id. According to Mishoe, one-half of the students he referred to-
minorities and nonminorities score less than 700 on the SAT scale. Id. A perfect
score on the SAT would be 1600. See American Testing Service, Princeton, NJ.
39. NCAA Proceeding (1983), supra note 1, at 110.
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also predicted this exclusion would continue if, in fact, the SATs
become the yardstick for the determination of academic standards. 40
Fort warned the delegation that "if this body continues along this
path of potential self-destruction on this issue, it will have done so
because it placed its dependence in this arena of the application of
academic standards on an aptitude testing mechanism whose very
validity repeatedly has been challenged by empirical evidence of
numerous studies.' '41
In conclusion, Fort stated:
I have seen black youths and white youths during my career as an
urban school superintendent and as a university chancellor desecrated
by the revelation that a questionable SAT score prevented that youngs-
ter from finding his or her place in the sun. You see, in the final
analysis, try as we might to avoid it, it has unfortunately become a
black-and-white issue. The bottom line ultimately is apparently one of
the color of a majority of the kids who take the floor as a "final
four" or the omnipotency of the combatants in the Cotton Bowl.4 2
Joseph V. Paterno, head football coach at Penn State University,
was a staunch proponent of Proposition 48. 41 Paterno noted that
unfortunately the debate over Proposition 48 had come to a point
where the Convention was "talking black and white." 44 Paterno
40. Id.
41. One of the empirical studies referred to at the convention was the 545
page research volume accumulated in 1980 by the Ralph Nader report. Id. According
to the Nader Report "ETS and SAT aptitude tests on the average predict grades
only eight to fifteen percent better than random prediction with a pair of dice."
Id. Fort quoted at length from the Nader Report stating:
The SAT does not just discriminate between the rich and the poor, or as
ETS-SAT representatives frequently describe the situation 'the affluent and
the disadvantaged,' it is not simply a matter of penthouse versus tenement.
The ETS and SAT scores discriminate not only against the rich and minority
of America but also between the rich and the majority of Americans. That
is, the members of the working and middle classes, black and white. The SAT
discriminates among virtually all levels of the country's classic structure across
both income and the occupation.
Finally, it says, the more money a person's family makes, the higher that
person tends to score. I would suggest to you that the empirical evidence on
the screen is such that it would be inappropriate, if not immoral, for this
body to place its eggs in a basket of question as it relates to the issue of
SAT.
Id. at 109.
42. Id. at 108.
43. Id. at 114.
44. Id. Paterno also expressed regrets that not one black coach was present




admonished the representatives from the predominately black insti-
tutions by stating:
I am really surprised that so many black educators have gotten up
here and kind of sold their young people down the river. You have
sold them short. I think you have underestimated what great compet-
itors the young black people are today in all areas, football, basketball,
athletics and other areas. If it takes 700 in the SAT to compete and
we give them time to be prepared, they will be prepared. 4s
Paterno also told the Convention that one of the reasons why
athletes fail in the class room is because they are ill-prepared aca-
demically.46 Paterno then illustrated his point with the following
scenario. 47 Once in the classroom, these athletes soon realize they are
out of their league; they cannot compete, he explained. 48 Soon their
pride will not permit them to go to that particular class. 49 Eventually,
they begin to cut class and just cop out.50
Conversely, Paterno stated that once athletes have some success in
the classroom, they blossom and begin to take pride in what they
have done in the classroom. They look forward to class; they become
motivated. Paterno then explained:
Motivation is just the question of having some success. People have
to be motivated. Let them have success at some place down the line
45. Id. However, Paterno did state:
I cannot in any way argue with these great black educators who lead our
black schools, because I have no feelings and I have had no experiences on
what goes on at your institutions. I do have 33 years of experience in
institutions which are predominantly white, and I have had great black athletes
who have made our program succeed.
Id.
46. Id. at 115-16. Paterno said, "[A]s you look out there, more of our black
athletes are frustrated later in life because they are not prepared for a life away
from athletics, because they never got what they should have from their college
experience." Id. at 116.
47. Id. at 115.
48. Id. He further explained:
They have never gotten the thrill of developing some intellectual curiosity.
They never have been comfortable computing, they never have had an op-
portunity to fulfill their potential because it started back when they were kids
at 12, 13 and 14 when they showed that great athletic ability and nobody
went in there and said, 'Hey, fine, you are great athletes, but if you want to
go to a quality school and you want to compete, you are going to have to
start to read a book; you are going to have to write, you are going to have
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and you build from that. Unfortunately, we have not done that for
so many of the kids that we have had in the last 15 years.
51
Paterno also told the Convention that the situation at hand was
not a racial one . 2 Instead, he viewed it simply as exploitation.5 3 In
Paterno's words, "We have raped a generation- and-a half of young
black athletes.
5 4
The Reverend Edmund P. Joyce of the University of Notre Dame
also favored passage of the Bylaw.55 Reverend Joyce stated: "Much
has been said about the possible discriminatory effect of using
minimum test scores .56 1 don't feel all that expert in this area," 5 7 he
added, "but I find it hard to believe that the distinguished presidents
who have sponsored Proposal No. 48 would do anything deliberately
discriminatory. 5 8 Reverend Joyce also told the Convention that he
felt that the opponents to Proposition 48 were trying to hang their
hats on the SAT in an attempt to prevent its adoption.5 9 Reverend
Joyce stated:
I think, ladies and gentlemen, that we must guard against using the
test-score argument as an excuse to prevent a much-needed reform
from being initiated. If, indeed, substantial and empirical evidence can
be brought forth within the next few years calling into serious question
the propriety of a 700 SAT score, today's legislation can be modified.
After all, it is not scheduled to go into effect until August 1986. But
I do urge the membership to delay this reform no longer. Let us bite
51. Id. at 115.
52. Id. Paterno did concede, however, that it had been a race problem for
the last 15 years. Id.
53. Id. In addition, Paterno stated:
We do not want to ruin them. I, for one, do not want to do that. I do not
want to exploit them, and I do not want to bring kids into our program and
give them expectations that they can do certain things and then frustrate them
in such a way that they become disillusioned.
Id. at 116.
54. Id. at 115. He continued:
We have taken kids and sold them on bouncing a ball and running with the
football and that being able to do certain things athletically was going to be
an end in itself. We cannot afford to do that to another generation. We
cannot afford to have kids come into our institutions and not be prepared to










the bullet today and take, the action which will make meaningful the
term student-athlete.
0
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND THE BYLAW
Given the number of athletes who were sidelined by the Bylaw, it
is surprising that not one has challenged its legality in a court of
law. Upon further reflection, however, it becomes evident that a law
suit challenging the legality of the Bylaw would be difficult to
commence and even more difficult to win. Under the most typical
case scenario, a black athlete declared ineligible would challenge the
Bylaw as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. However, before the athlete would have a chance at
proving that a fourteenth amendment violation existed, the athlete
first would have to get over the threshold question of whether state
action existed.
6 1
The requirement of state action draws a line between "private"
and "public" conduct. 62 "Private" conduct is beyond the reach of
constitutional restraint, while "public" conduct must meet the re-
quirements of the Constitution.63 "Public" conduct is the clearer of
the two, for when a governmental agency adopts rules pursuant to
its own procedures and implements them without private involvement,
this constitutes state action 4
60. Id. Many of the presidents from black institutions discussed the possibility
of passing Proposition 48 with allowances for petitions of exceptions from those
standards for institutions that found such petitions necessary. Id. at 123. Each year
the NCAA would publish these petitions. Id. It was suggested that such a system
would set higher standards of eligibility which approximately 95 percent of the
Division I institutions could meet. Id. At the Convention, the Reverend J. Donald
Monan of Boston College explained the ultimate effect of the exception. Id. He
stated:
The exceptions would prevent this legislation from having disproportionately
negative consequences on historically black schools or others that seek an
exemption. It would meet any objections about invasions of autonomy. Lastly,
it would hold up a target for 100 percent of the Division I institutions to
meet. This suggestion did not become an amendment, but it indicated that
mechanisms are available that would do the imperative job of raising academic
standards without creating unbridgeable chasms between our historically black
colleges and others.
Id.
61. J. Nowak, Constitutional Law 497-99 (1983). For an analysis of the
NCAA and state action, see McKenna, Age Limitations and the NCAA: Discrimi-
nation or Equating Competition?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 6 (1987).





Yet, when a private organization acts, the line of demarcation
becomes less clear. When a private organization acts, the existence
of state action ultimately depends upon whether the circumstances
fit one of several rationales for the application of constitutional
restraint to private entities. 6 The various rationales include the fol-
lowing: Has the private entity assumed a "public function?''6 Does
a "symbiotic relationship" or "nexus" exist between the private
organization and the government such that the private organization
ought to be subject to the same restraints as the government? 67 Is
the impact of the private organization's activity upon rights so
significant that the restraint is necessary in order to preserve those
rights?6 8 Most of the courts considering this issue have held that
actions by the NCAA constitute state action and are subject to the
limitations of the fourteenth amendment.6 9
In Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,7 0 the Mas-
sachusetts District Court labeled NCAA action as state action because
the NCAA performed public functions and had a symbiotic relation
with public entities. 71 In Associated Students, Inc. v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Association,7 2 the Ninth Circuit became the first
65. Id.
66. Id. at 502-05.
67. Id. at 516-18.
68. Id. at 513-23.
69. But, see McDonald v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 370 F.
Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974). In McDonald, athletes who had competed in basketball
on behalf of a state university brought action against the university and the NCAA
of which the university (Long Beach State) was a member. Id. at 626. The athletes
challenged the declarations of their ineligibility for futher participation in intercol-
legiate athletics and sought a preliminary injunction. Id. The court held that the
action by the NCAA in imposing penalties upon the university for infractions of its
bylaws, resulting in the university's declaring athletes ineligible to participate in
athletics, did not involve state action. Id. at 631. Thus, the athletes had no due
process right to a hearing before the NCAA. Id. at 632.
70. 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
71. Id. at 1156-57.
72. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1973). In Associated Students, a students'
organization of the California State University- Sacramento and individual students
alleged that the NCAA 1.600 Rule resulted in an unreasonable classification. Id. at
1252. Based on the district court's decision in Parrish v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 361 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (W.D. La. 1973), the Ninth Circuit held that
the NCAA's enforcement activities were "state action." Id. Yet the court also found
that the Rule's classification was reasonably related to the purposes for which it
had been enacted. 493 F.2d at 1254-55. According to evidence offered by the NCAA,
the Rule was adopted to reduce the possibility of exploiting young athletes by
recruiting those who would not be representative of the student body and probably
would not graduate. Id. at 1255. See also text infra.
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federal appellate court to find such state action. 73 Less than a year
later the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed
suit in Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion.7 4 In Howard University, the court examined the size, influence
and wealth of the NCAA.7 5 The court ultimately concluded that
private institutions following the policies of the NCAA had engaged
in the requisite degree of state action to require constitutional re-
straint.
76
Finally, in Parrish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
77
the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was state action because the
NCAA performs a public function regulating intercollegiate athlet-
ics. 78 The decisions in Howard University, Associated Students and
Parrish have been most persuasive. 79 For instance, the First Circuit
relied on these three cases involving the NCAA and found govern-
mental action in Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria.0
The addition of the Rivas Tenorio decision only strengthened the
foundation for finding state action, a fact reflected when the Eighth
Circuit cited with approval, all four cases in Regents of the University
of Minnesota v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.81
Arguably, the Supreme Court's decisions in Blum v. Yaretsky,8 2
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 83, and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,84 have
73. 493 F.2d at 1255.
74. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) for a complete discussion of Howard
University, see text infra.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 216-20.
77. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975). In Parrish, the NCAA's 1.600 Rule was
challeged once again, this time by Centenary's Robert Parrish, who later starred on
the Boston Celtics of the NBA. Id. The Fifth Circuit upheld the Rule because it
passed "constitutional muster" under the traditional "minimum rationality" stand-
ard. Id. at 1034.
78. Id.
79. See text and accompanying notes, infra.
80. 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Rivas Tenorio, see infra
note 65.
81. 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977). In Regents of the University of Minnesota,
the University and some of its agents and faculty members brought an action
challenging the act of the NCAA in placing the University's athletic teams on
indefinite probation for its refusal to find three Minnesota student athletes ineligible.
Id. at 354. In finding the existence of "state action" the court stated: "We, like
the First Circuit in Rivas Tenorio, . . . agree with the anlaysis and conclusion of
Judge Tamm for the District of Columbia Circuit in Howard University .... ." Id.
at 365.
82. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In Blum, respondents, representing a class of medical
patients, challenged decisions by nurisng homes in which they resided, to discharge
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narrowed the reach of the state action doctrine. 5 Arguably, this
narrowing will not foreclose the application of the state action
principle to the NCAA.8 6 For instance, in her article The New NCAA
Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?,8 7 Professor Linda
Greene argued that the recent state action trilogy could be distin-
guished on the facts alone.8 Greene stated: "None of the recent
or transfer patients without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 993. The
Court held that respondents failed to establish "state" action in the facility-initiated
discharges and transfers to lower levels of care and thus, failed to prove violation
of the fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 1012. In short, the extensive governmental
funding and regulation of nursing homes did not make the transfer decisions "state"
action. Id. at 1005-12.
83. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). In Edmonson Oil Co., respondents filed suit in
Virginia state court on a debt owed by petitioner and sought prejudgment attachment
of certain property belonging to petitioner. Id. at 924. A writ of attachment was
issued and executed with a hearing set for 34 days after the levy. Id.This resulted
in the trial judge dismissing the attachment for respondents' failure to establish the
alleged statutory grounds for attachment. Id. at 925. Petitioner then brought a §
1983 claim in the federal district court alleging that, in attaching his property,
respondents had acted jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without
due process of law. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed, holding: The statutory
scheme obviously is the product of state action, and a private party's joint partici-
pation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to
characterize that party as a "state actor" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 941-42.
84. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In Rendell-Baker, petitioners, a former vocational
counselor and teacher at a privately operated school for maladjusted high school
students brought separate actions in district court under 42 U.S. C. § 1983. Id. at
834- 35. The petitioner claimed that since public funds accounted for 90%7 of the
school's operating budget and the school had to meet certain state regulations to
receive the funds, this constituted state action. Id. Thus, petitioners claimed they
had been discharged by the school in violation of their first, fifth and fourteenth
amendment rights. Id. In relying on Blum, the Court held that the school's receipt
of public funds did not make the discharge decisions acts of the state. Id. at 840.
85. In finding state action with regard to NCAA action, most courts have
based their decisions on the state support received by the private university of the
NCAA. See, Associated Students, Inc., 493 F.2d at 1254-55 and Spath v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 728 F.2d at 28. Thus, if the Blum decision, finding
that mere receipt of public funding does not constitute state action, is extended to
cases involving the NCAA, any state action argument will have to be similar to
those theories accepted in Parrish, 506 F.2d 1028 (the NCAA performs a traditional
public-governmental function); see also Howard University 510 F.2d 213. (state
action based on size, wealth and influence of NCAA).
86. See Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or
Racism? 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101 (1983).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 125. Professor Greene stated:
The Court's recent decision involved the application of the state action doctrine
to varied fact situations: (1) to a private school that was both state regulated
and funded, (2) to a private nursing home that was both state regulated and
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decisions was unanimous. A careful reading of the various majority,
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions merely reinforces the
view that findings of state action are likely to be based on factual
idiosyncrasies rather than clear principles.''89 If there is a common
thread running through these cases it is this: "If the state explicitly
approves the rules complained of and cooperated in their implemen-
tation, then sufficient state action may exist to impose constitutional
restraint. "90
In applying the recent Supreme Court decisions involving state
action to the NCAA, the courts of appeal have reached different
results. In Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,91
the Fourth Circuit held that adoption of the Bylaw was not state
action.92 In its opinion the court found that it is not enough, in
order to find state action, that an institution is subsidized and highly
regulated by the state.93 According to the court's decision, if the
state in its regulatory or subsidizing function does not order or cause
the action complained of, and the function is not one traditionally
reserved to the state, then there is no "state action". 9 4 In reaching
funded, and (3)to a corporation that utilized state law attachment procedure
to seize property for the payment of an overdue debt. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 124-25.
89. Id. at 125.
90. Id. Professor Greene suggested that this principle seemed responsible for
the finding of state action in Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and for the
absence of it in Blum, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), and Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
29 ST. Louis U.L.J. at 125 note 122. In Edmonson Oil Co., the Court stated:
"[M]e have consistently held that a private party's joint participation with state
officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party
as a 'state actor' for purposes of the fourteenth amendment." 457 U.S. at 941.
91. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984). Arlosoroff was an Israeli citizen. Id. at
1020. After his discharge from the Israeli Army in March 1979 at age 22, he
participated in 17 amatuer tennis tournaments. Id. He was also a member of the
Israeli Davis Cup Team. Id. In August of 1981, Arlosoroff enrolled at Duke
University. Id. During his freshman year, Arlosoroff became the team's number
one singles player while leading the Blue Devils to the Atlantic Coast Conference
Championship. Id. He was later selected to the All-American Tennis Team. Id.
After his freshmen year, though, the NCAA declared him ineligible for further
competition of the basis of NCAA Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3). Id.
92. Id. at 1021.
93. Id. at 1022. The court noted that there was no suggestion that the
representatives of the state institutions joined together to vote as a block to effect
adoption of the Bylaw over the objection of private institutions. Id.
94. Id. The court stated:
The NCAA serves the common need of member instiutions for regulation of
athletics while correlating their diverse interests. Through the representatives
of all of the members Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3) was adopted, not as a result of
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its decision, the Fourth Circuit found that the notion of "state
action" fostered in Howard University and Parrish had been rejected
by the Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker and Blum. 95
In Spath v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,96 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit chose not to pursue the
question. 97 Instead, the court noted that while the weight of authority
would support the plaintiff's position that the NCAA is sufficiently
state connected to incur 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability, 98 "recent trends
have limited that concept . ...99 The court then skirted the issue
by stating: "Since Lowell at least, as a state funded university, may
be a state actor, we move, instead, to Spath's particular merits."1 0
In Butts v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,'0' the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals failed to discuss the issue of "state ac-
governmental compulsion, but in the service of the common interests of the
members. The adoption of the Bylaw was private conduct, not state action.
Id.
95. Id. at 1021. In no uncertain terms the court stated: "Rendell-Baker,
Blum and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, Co., not Lugar, control here." Id. at
1022. In Jackson, 419 U.S. 345 (1975), the petitioner alleged that termination of
her electricity constituted state action. Id. at 347-48. The Court noted that it had
found state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state. Id. at 352. Yet, the Court held that Pennsylvania
was not sufficiently connected with the challenged termination of electricity by
merely granting the power company a monopoly to make the respondent's conduct
attributable to the state for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 358-
59.
96. 728 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1984). For a complete discussion of Spath, see
infra, notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
97. Id. at 28.
98. Id., citing Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492
(1st Cir. 1977). In Rivas Tenorio, Colombian citizens brought an action against a
Puerto Rican athletic association, contending that they were deprived of equal
protection by virtue of one of the association's rules. Id. at 493. The rule in question
prohibited non-Puerto Rican student- athletes from participating in annual compe-
titions if they entered member institutions after their 21st birthday. Id. After the
district court dismissed the complaint, the First Circuit reversed, holding that the
athletic association's regulations represented action "under color of" Commonwealth
law. Therefore, the regulation in question should have been subjected to strict
constitutional scrutiny because of its facial discrimination against aliens. Id. at 494.
99. Spath, 728 F.2d at 28 (citing Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum,
457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
100. Spath, 728 F.2d at 28.
101. 751 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1984). In the district court though, Judge Fullam
found the First Circuit's opinion in Spath very persuasive. In Butts v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 600 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Pa. 1984), Judge Fullam
concluded:
Virtually every contention advanced by plaintiff in this action has been
considered, and firmly rejected, by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Spath
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tion.102 This was particularly surprising since the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals was familiar with and, in fact, cited Greene's article. 03
Until the Supreme Court finally addresses the issue of state action
and its applicability to the NCAA, Greene's article seems to represent
the most pragmatic viewpoint. As Greene emphasized:
Subjecting the NCAA to the reach of the Constitution would not be
inconsistent with recent Supreme Court decisions. Those decisions have
not undermined the principle that closely intertwined joint ventures
between private and public entities must abide by constitutional prin-
ciples. Even if the foregoing principle is limited by the tentatively
emerging requirement that the state must explicitly approve of private
rules and cooperate in their implementation, it is nonetheless appro-
priate to subject the NCAA to the constitutional limitations.' °4
IV. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
If an athlete challenged the present Bylaw, it would not be the
first time that NCAA eligibility requirements have come under at-
tack.'0 5 This was especially true of the NCAA 1.600 Rule which was
the subject of numerous lawsuits. °6 The- 1.600 Rule required that
NCAA-affiliated schools grant athletic scholarships to applicants who
could "predict"- on the basis of their high school grade point
average or class rank and their grade on one of two standardized
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 728 F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1984). In
light of this precedent, plaintiff's burden of showing a likelihood of success
on the merits is indeed a heavy one. The First Circuit's opinion is persuasive,
and I have no reason to suppose that the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit would reach a different conclusion.
600 F. Supp. at 74.
Thus, one can assume one of two things. Either Judge Fullam sidestepped the
issue as did his colleagues in the First Circuit or he believed "state action" existed.
The fact that he reached the merits of the case only strengthens these two alternatives.
102. Butts, 751 F.2d at 612. In the opinion, Judge Higginbotham quoted at
length from Professor Greene's article. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Greene, supra note 86, at 127.
105. For an analysis of the NCAA age limitation requirements, see McKenna,
supra note 61.
106. Bylaw 4-6-(b)-(1) was amended at the NCAA annual convention on
January 13, 1973, at which time the requirement that a student predict a 1.600
grade point average before being declared eligible to participate in intercollegiate
athletics was replaced by a requirement that a student need only graduate from high
school with a 2.00 in order to be declared eligible to participate in athletics. This
amendment would not become effective until the 1974-75 academic year and until
that time, the 1.600 Rule would continue to be enforced by the NCAA.
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achievement tests-a minimum 1.600 grade point average during their
first year in college. 0 7
Under the NCAA prediction tables, a student-athlete's grade point
is estimated on the basis of a formula utilizing (1) either high school
grades or rank in high school class and (2) a score on a scholastic
aptitude examination (either the SAT or the ACT). 0 8 If a student
had no score reported on either the SAT or ACT, it was impossible
for him to predict a 1.600 grade point average as required under the
1.600 Rule, whatever his high school grade point average or rank
was. °9
Subsequent to the adoption of the 1.600 Rule, Official Interpre-
tation 418 (0.1. 418) of the Rule was adopted." 0 A pertinent part
of 0.1. 418 provides: "A student-athlete who practices or participates
while ineligible under the provisions of Bylaw 4-6-(b)-(1) [the 1.600
Rule], shall be charged with the loss of one year of practice and
varsity eligibility by his institution for each year gained improperly
which shall be the next year the student is in attendance . . . . "
For example, in Associated Students, Inc. v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association,"2 a students' organization of the California
State University at Sacramento and individual students alleged that
the NCAA 1.600 Rule resulted in an unreasonable classification.13
107. See Parrish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1030. Specifically, the NCAA
1.600 Rule stated:
A member institution shall not be eligible to enter a team or individual
competitors in an NCAA-sponsored meet, unless the institution in the conduct
of all its intercollegiate athletic programs: (1) limits its scholarship or grant-
in-aid awards (for which the recipient's athletic ability is considered in any
degree), and eligibility for participation in athletics or in organized athletic
practice sessions during the first year in residence to student- athletes who
have predicted minimum grade point averages of at least 1.600 (based on a
maximum of 4.000) as determined by the Association's national prediction
tables or Association-approved conference or institutional tables. NCAA By-
law 4-6(b)(1), A. 175.
108. See Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1253.
109. Id.
110. Under the NCAA Constitution, article six, § 2 (1972), the NCAA Counsel
is empowered to make official interpretations of the constitution and bylaws which
are binding after they are published and circulated to the membership.
111. Id.
112. 493 F.2d 1251.
113. Id. at 1252. The eleven individual plaintiffs were student-athletes who
were admitted to CSUS under the California Administrative Code, Title V, §
40759(b), commonly referred to as the "Four Percent Rule." Id. Students admitted
under that program are not required to take standard achievement tests such as the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT) in order to
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The district court held that the actions of the NCAA, prohibited by
the injunction,' 4 violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution.
115
The district court concern was not with the 1.600 Rule per se, but
rather with the 1.600 Rule as interpreted by 0.1.418.116 The court
found, bearing in mind that the central purpose of the 1.600 Rule
was to insure that the individual who participates in intercollegiate
athletics is capable of succeeding academically at the college level,
this new classification was overinclusive and not rationally related to
the objective of the Rule."
7
The court based its findings on the fact that the 1.600 Rule declared
ineligible not only those student athletes who failed to predict a
minimum 1.600 grade point average and who have not yet completed
their first year in college, and not only those student athletes who
failed to achieve a minimum 1.600 grade point average for the first
qualify for admission. Id. Instead, they are admitted on the basis of such factors
as economic need, motivation and maturity. Id. In the opinion of the University,
each of the plaintiff-athletes had the potential to succeed academically at the college
level, notwithstanding deficiencies in their educational background which would
normally have prevented their admission under the usual standards. Id.
114. Id. The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
defendants-appellants, (NCAA), from enforcing its freshman eligibility Rule 1.600,
only as to the plaintiffs- appellees Lopez and Martinez, and also restraining the
NCAA from penalizing the California State University at Sacramento (CSUS) for
its failure to disqualify the plaintiffs from athletic participation for one year. Id.
The district court also held that plaintiff, Associated Students, Inc., did not have
standing in this action, and did not grant the injunction as to the other nine
individual plaintiffs for the reason that the year of ineligibility imposed against them
had expired. Id.
115. Id. In so holding, the district court stated that the NCAA's enforcement
activities were "state action" and therefore subject to the standards of the fourteenth
amendment. The court also determined that the preliminary injunction would not
alter the status quo ante litem. Id..
116. Id. at 1253. See note 100 and accompanying text, supra.
117. Id. The court found that the NCAA classification system did not meet
the guidelines set forth in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Id. at 1255. In Reed,
the Supreme Court stated:
In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the four-
teenth amendment does not deny to states the power to treat different classes
of persons in different ways. (citations omitted). The equal protection clause
of that amendment does, however, deny to states the power to legislate that
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different
classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.
A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.' citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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year in college, but additionally those student athletes who demon-
strated by the conclusion of the first year that they had the ability
to achieve academic success by actually earning at least a 1.600 grade
point average." 8
The district court stated:
Once a student has an earned grade point average achieved over a
reasonable period of time, then it is unreasonable, in light of the
purposes of the Rule, to impose sanctions against the student athlete
based on the fact that he failed to predict a certain grade point
average. Instead, any sanctions imposed should be predicated on the
actual grade point average attained by the student."9
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the lower court and reversed
finding that the 1.600 Rule's classification was reasonably related to
the purposes of the Rule for which it was enacted. 20 The court
conceded, "It may be that in the application of the Rule unreasonable
results may be produced in certain situations, which is not unusual
in the application of a generalized rule such as the one here.''
However, the court noted that one of the purposes of the official
interpretation of the 1.600 Rule was to prevent member schools from
granting scholarships to student-athletes who do not show a possi-
bility of attaining a degree after taking part in the prescribed testing
procedures before entering college'2and that the plaintiff's theory
3
of retroactive eligibility would prevent effective enforcement. 24 The
court explained:
In order to meet that objective, determination of the eligibility of a
student-athlete must be made at the time of the student's application
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 493 F.2d 1251.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained:
According to plaintiffs' theory and the decision of the lower court, all member
schools could recruit athletes without giving any examination to them, or
those athletes whose examinations did not predict successful graduation, and
then if they did obtain a higher grade point average than 1.600 after the first
year in school, they would be entitled to participate in NCAA sponsored
athletics thereafter. Such a situation would prevent effective enforcement of
the 1.600 Rule which we believe to be rational in order to achieve NCAA's
objective. Id. at 1256.
124. Id. The court stated that the plaintiff's theory "would also permit
ineligible students to engage in first year athletics along with those who proved to




and certification. If determination of eligibility is made at a later date,
the classification would be destroyed. Such a procedure would allow
colleges to recruit ineligible athletes with the hope that they would
meet graduation prediction standards after their first year in college
so as to become eligible for athletics during their college life.'1
Less than a year later, the Fifth Circuit faced a similar question
in Parrish v. National Collegiate Athletic Association. 26 In 1973,
Robert Parrish 27 and his teammates had requested preliminary and
permanent injunctions against the NCAA to prevent it from applying
the 1.600 Rule against them and declaring them ineligible to play on
the Centenary basketball team.128 Although four of his teammates
were parties to the suit, it was quite obvious that Parrish was the
"center of attention." As the district court stated:
A conservative evaluation of the evidence presented by plaintiffs shows
that most of it pertained to Parrish and this suit probably would not
have been brought had it not been for this man's particular prowess
on the basketball court. Defendants' evidence is based almost entirely
upon Parrish's situation, and very little on those of his co-plaintiffs. 129
In order to meet the requirements of NCAA's 1.600 Rule, Parrish
took the ACT twice, his score being an 8.130 This score caused most
colleges to "back off" because they felt Parrish could not fulfill the
1.600 requirement.' 3' Yet, Centenary's athletic department told Parrish
and his teammates that they had been recruited by Centenary in
conformance with the NCAA's rules. 132 The NCAA warned Cente-
125. Id.
126. 506 F.2d 1028 (1975).
127. Parrish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (1973). Parrish, 7'1" in height,
was designated a "super-athlete." Id. He was recognized during his last high school
year by national magazines, newspapers, and sports columnists as probably the
number one or number two leading basketball prospect in the United States, in the
manner of Wilt Chamberlain and Lew Alcindor. Id. Parrish was named to several
All-American high school teams and chosen by the Basketball News as the number
one high school graduate basketball player in the country. Id. Of course, he was
recruited, even courted, by almost every major college in the nation. Id.
128. 361 F. Supp. 1220 (1973).
129. Id. at 1223.
130. Id. As the court stated: "Regrettably, before achieving such prominence,
he had been somewhat deprived, both educationally and economically; and probably
began to aspire ambitiously toward a full higher education only after 'the baskets
began to swish."' Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. With this in mind the Fifth Circuit stated: "In fact, however, the




nary, both before and after the college admitted the appellants on
athletic scholarships, that the young men could not be granted athletic
eligibility because of the Rule. 33 However, Centenary failed to heed
the warnings and the NCAA applied sanctions against it.34 These
sanctions meant that unless Centenary declared the players ineligible
for basketball, the school could not play in any NCAA sponsored
tournaments or in any NCAA sanctioned televised games. 35 The
school declined to challenge this decision through the NCAA's own
appeals procedure, 136 but also refused to declare the players ineligi-
ble. 
137
When it appeared that Centenary's basketball team would be
invited to a postseason tournament, the players requested a permanent
injunction forbidding the NCAA from enforcing its sanctions against
Centenary. 138 The district judge granted a temporary restraining order
and extended it once, 39 but the players permitted it to dissolve when
133. The district court stated:
[The] NCAA, knowing that he was going to be a highly recruited prospect,
had familiarized itself with Parrish's high school record before the summer
of 1972, well prior to his being signed to an athletic scholarship contract by
Centenary. During June of 1972, the NCAA received information that Cen-
tenary was going to sign Parrish, and one of its representatives, Berst, called
then Coach Wallace and asked him how Parrish was going to predict a 1.600
score. Wallace replied that the school was going to convert the ACT test score
to an SAT score, whereupon Berst informed him that this was prohibited by
the Rules. Subsequently, the NCAA advised Centenary through its coaching
staff and its Director of Athletics (who has "resigned" since the controversy
arose), orally and by written correspondence, that the College could not
convert ACT scores to SAT scores. As "water runs from a duck's back,"
these warnings fell on deaf ears and failed to prevent Centenary's Athletic
Department successfully from proceeding with its efforts to sign Parrish upon
a scholarship contract.
Id.
134. Id. The court detailed the sanctions in a footnote. The court stated:
The NCAA placed Centenary on indefinite probation for incorrectly certifying
appellants as eligible for basketball scholarships and other financial aid.
Centenary could reduce the duration of its probation from indefinite to two
years by "conducting its inter-collegiate athletic program in accordance with
all requirements and interpretations of NCAA bylaw 4-6-(b)(1) [1.600 Rule].
App. at 57. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The NCAA appeals process is only available to member institutions
and not to individual athletes.
137. Id. As a result, Parrish and his teammates continued to participate in
regular season athletics. Id.
138. Id. at 1221.
139. Id. The district court acted pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id.
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Centenary's team received no postseason invitations.140 A hearing was
then held on the declaratory and injunctive aspects of the case.
141
Following the hearing, the district court held that the constitutional
challenge of the 1.600 Rule did not raise a substantial federal question
under the civil rights statutes § 8 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983.142 The court also found that the 1.600 Rule had a rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes and therefore was not in
violation of the equal protection clause. 4  Finally, the district court
held that there had been no denial by the NCAA of due process.
44
On appeal, the players conceded that no fundamental right was
involved. 45 However, in an attempt to have the court apply a strict
scrutiny test, the players argued that the 1.600 Rule impermissibly
discriminated against some vaguely defined class. 146 Although the
court appeared partially receptive to at least two of the players'
theories, 147 it quickly noted that their entire case lacked probative
evidence as to actual discrimination. 48 The court stated:
True, appellants offered the testimony of two witnesses to the effect
that the achievement tests used to predict probable success during the
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1225. The court relied on Mitchell v. Louisiana High School
Athletic Association, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970). The Mitchell court stated:
A claimed denial of equal protection by state action does arise under the
Constitution and would normally be within the district court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, unless unsubstantial or frivolous .... The classifi-
cation made by the eligibility regulation is neither inherently suspect nor an
encroachment on a fundamental right. On the other hand, it is grounded in,
and reasonably related to, a legitimate state interest. Id.
143. Id. at 1226-28. The court noted: [the players] also presented evidence to
show that the SAT and ACT tests discriminated against all of them in some form.
One (Parrish) came from a minority group, one from a rural school, etc. This type
of evidence was rejected as having no weight in Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish
School Board, 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973). Id. at 1226.
144. Id. at 1228. The district court also opined that the 1.600 Rule did not
deprive any player of "his right to associate with any particular group, i.e., the
right to associate with those persons competing in interscholastic athletic events."
Id. at 1229.
145. 506 F.2d at 1033.
146. Id. An examination of the "appellant's briefs and their contentions at
oral argument suggests at least seven potential suspect classes: (1) blacks; (2) cultural
minorities; (3) the educationally deprived; (4) persons of less than average intelligence;
(5) late achieving students; (6)student athletes; and (7) impecunious student athletes."
Id.
147. Id. The court noted that except for "blacks" and "persons of less than
average intelligence", suggested classes were neither traditionally suspect nor did
they possess the features usually associated with "suspectness." Id.
148. Id.
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first year in college were culturally biased in that they were geared for
white middle class students. Conclusory allegations however, are no
substitute for a factual showing of actual discriminatory intent or
effect. 1
49
Consequently, the court applied the traditional "minimum rational-
ity" standard.
150
The court of appeals agreed with the district court, finding that
the 1.600 Rule was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose
and thus passed constitutional muster.151 The Fifth Circuit also dis-
missed the players' due process contention as unavailing. After noting
that the privilege of participating in athletics fell outside the protec-
tion of the law, the court stated:
[A]ppellants ... have lost only the opportunity to play in NCAA
sponsored tournaments and televised games. Whatever the status of
the alleged right to participate in interscholastic athletics, in the present
circumstances we discern no "property" or "liberty" interest of which
appellants have been deprived because of the NCAA's enforcement of
its 1.600 Rule against Centenary.
52
Finally, in Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation, 53 a private university and one of its star soccer players
sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the NCAA alleging
that the organization's enforcement of the Foreign Student' 4 and
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1034.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court also stated that appellants wisely abandoned at oral
argument their attempt to create a property interest out of the alleged injury to
their hoped-for careers in professional basketball from the inability to gain tour-
nament experience and television exposure. Both the injury and the career are far
too speculative to establish a property interest as defined in Roth. Moreover,
appellants concede that their athletic scholarships, assuming for the moment that
these would constitute a property interest requiring due process protection, Cf.
Wright v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n. supra, 501 F.2d at 27, remain in full effect.
Hence, the NCAA's actions have caused no deprivation with regard to them. Id.
153. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
154. Id. The "Foreign-Student Rule" states:
Any participant in a National Collegiate Athletic Association event must meet
all of the following requirements for eligibility .... He must not previously
have engaged in three seasons of varsity competition after his freshman year,
it being understood that: ... Participation as an individual or as a repre-
sentative of any team whatever in a foreign country by an alien student-athlete
in each twelve-month period after his nineteenth birthday and prior to his
matriculation at a member institution shall count as one year of varisty
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1.600 Rules had violated their constitutional rights.155 An NCAA
investigation had revealed that two of Howard University's student-
athletes had participated in the 1971 NCAA soccer championship in
violation of the Foreign Student Rule.
156
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
found that the Foreign Student Rule violated equal protection because
it created an unjustifiable alienage classification.15 7 However, the
court upheld the NCAA 1.600 Rule finding it "reasonably and
narrowly related to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the
association."' 5 8 Both parties filed cross appeals to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.5 9 While the court of
appeals found that the Foreign Student Rule discriminated against
foreign student-athletes, it upheld the 1.600 Rule.16° The court found
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Associated Students, Inc. v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association persuasive.' 6' The court held that the
1.600 Rule was not invalid as denying equal protection because it
competition.
Id. at 215.
In addition to the "Foreign Student Rule" and "1.600 Rule" the NCAA's "Five
Year Rule" was also challenged in Howard. Id. The Five Year Rule forbade member
institutions to permit student- athletes to represent them in intercollegiate athletic
competitions unless they completed their eligibility within five calendar years; e.g.,
they are given five years in which to compete in up to four varsity seasons in any
one sport. Id. at 221-22.
155. The University and the players alleged that the rule violated equal
protection because it created an unjustifiable alienage classification. Id. at 220, 222.
156. Id. at 215. The investigation was probably instituted in January 1972
when the NCAA staff received a letter attaching a Washington Post sports article
suggesting possible inquiry into the Howard soccer program. Id. The Post's article
featured Keith Aqui, the 25 year-old freshman star of the soccer team. Id. Howard
Universtiy won the NCAA soccer championship in 1971 after finishing third in 1970.
Id.
157. Howard University, 367 F. Supp. 926, 930 (D.C. 1973) aff'd, 510 F.2d
213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Though the court acknowledged that the NCAA was properly
concerned with preventing older players coming from abroad and dominating cham-
pionship competition, it believed there was a less restictive means. Id. As stated by
the court: "To meet a felt need, the Association has, in effect, 'thrown the baby
out with the bath."' Id.
158. Id.
159. Howard University, 510 F.2d at 214. Howard University appealed that
part of the district court's decision upholding the Five Year Rule and the 1.600
Rule. Id.
160. Id. at 222.
161. Id. at 221. For a discussion of Associated Students, see infra note 112
and accompanying text.
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was reasonably adapted to the objectives of reducing recruitment and
exploitation of young athletes.
162
V. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Given the decisions in Associated Students, Inc., Parrish and
Howard University, it is unlikely that the Bylaw could be successfully
challenged. Through the years, courts have firmly held that the rules
of the NCAA, especially those regarding academic eligibility of
athletes, are reasonably related to the objectives of the association.'
63
Although most of the courts will find "state action," it is evident
that they will go no further.
Since plaintiff players have no opportunity of prevailing in court,
their only chance of redress would appear to lie with their respective
institutions. As members of the NCAA, the institutions most effected
by the Bylaw could lobby for an amendment or a special exception.'"
In order to mount a successful challenge, however, the schools
opposing the Bylaw must present some kind of statistical data such
as the type listed below which shows that the Bylaw has a dispro-
portionate impact. For example, the Conference Report Card' 6 that
follows clearly shows that the Bylaw had a greater impact on the
traditionally black institutions. The Report Card is the result of a
survey of NCAA Division I and I-AA colleges and universities that
162. Id. The court stated:
One primary objective of the Rule is to prevent member schools from granting
scholarships to individuals who do not have a realistic chance of obtaining a
degree. To effectuate that objective, the eligibility determination obviously
must be made at the time of the student's application and certification. To
adopt appellants' theory would permit member institutions to recruit ineligible
athletes with the hope (or expectation) that they might meet prediction stand-
ards after their first year in college and thus become eligible for athletics
during the remainder of their college career. In order to prevent such a
complete undermining of the Rule's legitimate objective, 0.1. 418 requires
ineligibility for an improperly certified athlete, regardless of his college aca-
demic record. A penalty need not be the best that might have been provided,
but only reasonably related to the Rule's purpose. We think that the 1.600
Rule, as interpreted by 0.1. 418, meets that test. Id.
163. See supra notes 105-62 and accompanying text.
164. NCAA Const. Art. 5, § IC (1978-79). In certain circumstances, the
NCAA has the power to grant exemptions and exceptions to its rules. Id. The courts
are unclear as to whether an athletic association must provide a hardship exception.
See J. Rapp, Educational Law, § 3.09 [4] [a] at 3-164 (1986).
165. See-Mulligan, supra note 6, at 76.
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were affected by the Bylaw.es The following represents the number
of recruits, as of August 8, who were ineligible to compete in the
two major revenue-producing sports during the 1986-87 season 67 and
is organized on the basis of the schools' basketball conference mem-
bership. The football ineligible recruits are included in the basketball
conferences for simplicity.
TABLE B
School Football Basketball School Football Basketball
Atlantic Coast Conference Metro Conference
Clemson 6 1 Cincinnati 1 6
Duke 0 0 Florida State 5 1
Georgia Tech 1 0 Louisville 1 0
NC State 1 0 Memphis State 3 1
North Carolina 1 0 S. Carolina 1 0
Wake Forest 1 0 S. Mississippi 1 2
Maryland 2 0 Va. Tech 0 0
Virginia 2 0 TOTAL 12 10
TOTAL 14 1
Atlantic 10 Conference Mid-American Conference
Temple I I Ball State 1 1
St. Joseph's - 1 Bowling Green NA NA
West Virginia I I C. Michigan 0 0
Duquesne - 0 E. Michigan 1 I
George Washington - 0 W. Michigan 0 1
Massachusetts 0 0 Kent State 2 0
Penn State 0 0 Miami Univ. 0 0
Rhode Island 0 0 N. Illinois 4 1
Rutgers 0 0 Toledo 1 2
St. Bonaventure - 0 Ohio Univ. 1 0
TOTAL 2 3 TOTAL 10 6
166. Id. The figures were originally obtained by Daily News staffers Kevin
Mulligan and Mary Ellen Guld in a month long telephone survey of NCAA Division
I athletic departments. They were later updated by the author. The figures include
athletes who have accepted Division I scholarships and will be ineligible their first
years; athletes who will pay their own way in their (ineligible) freshman years, and
retain four years eligibility; and scholarship athletes who have chosen to go to junior
college rather than sit out their first years.
167. Id.
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Western Athletic Conference Major Independents
Air Force 0 0 Notre Dame 3 1
Hawaii 4 1 Univ. Miami (Fla.) 5 0
Brigham Young 1 0 Army 0 0
Colorado St. 0 0 Navy 0 0
San Diego St. 1 0 DePaul - 2
Texas-El Paso 1 2 Dayton -
Utah 1 I Cleveland St. - 0
Wyoming 0 0 Marquette - 0
New Mexico 2 1 Detroit - 2
TOTAL 10 5 TOTAL 8 6
Football Basketball
TOTAL 224 121
The survey reveals that the conference most effected by the Bylaw
was the Mid-Eastern Athletic Association Conference (MEAC) which
had 37 athletes declared ineligible. 6 The MEAC lost the services of
27 football and 10 basketball players. 69 This is not surprising since
the MEAC is comprised of eight traditionally black institutions.
170
However, it should be noted that 22 of the 27 ineligible football
players were from only two schools in the conference, Bethune-
Cookman and Delaware State. The conference with the next highest
total of ineligible athletes was the Southeastern Conference which
had 31 athletes sidelined.'17 The difference between the two leading
conferences is deceptive though since the SEC is comprised of ten
institutions, two more than the MEAC.' 72 Therefore, a better indi-
cator of just how wide the gap actually is between the historically
black schools and others is the Big Eight Conference. 73 The Big
Eight conference lost 19 football recruits and 8 basketball players
for a total of 27 ineligible athletes. 74 In other words, MEAC had
ten more athletes declared ineligible than a conference of comparable
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The MEAC is composed of the following schools: Bethune-Cookman,
Copin State, Delaware State, Howard University, Maryland Eastern Shore, Morgan
State, North Carolina A & T and South Carolina State. Id.
171. Id. Alabama, Auburn, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana State,
Mississippi State, Tennessee and Vanderbilt are members of the SEC.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Big Eight consists of Colorado, Iowa State, Kansas, Kansas
State, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Oklahoma State. Id.
174. Id.
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size. 175 However, the gap widens appreciably once the MEAC is
compared to other eight- member conferences. 76 The Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC)' 77 had only 15 ineligible athletes while the Big Sky
Conference lost just 1 athlete to the Bylaw. 178 The results from a
survey of last year's senior high school basketball players and how
the Bylaw affected them is also striking. 79
The following is a list of the top 50 high school basketball
recruits, 80 the schools they chose to attend, their eligibilities, and the
options they chose pursuant to the Bylaw.' 8'
The survey reveals that 14 out of the 50 players(28%) surveyed
did not qualify. 18 2 Of those 14 non-qualifiers, 13 or 92.81o were
black.8 1 This figure is tempered somewhat by the fact that 41 of the
50 top players were also black.1 4 However, the percentage of black
non-qualifiers is still disproportionate to the number of white non-
qualifiers. For instance, one out of every three top black recruits
(33.3%1o) did not qualify compared to only 1 out of every 9 white
basketball players (1.10o).185
Player Race Hometown College Status Option
1. JR Reid B Virginia Beach N. Carolina Qualifier -
2. Terry Mills B Romulus, Mich. Michigan Non-qualifier 3 yrs.
3. Rumeal
Robinson B Cambridge, Mass. Michigan Non-qualifier 3 yrs.
4. Rex Chapman W Owensboro, Ky. Kentucky Qualifier -
5. Tony Pendleton B Flint, Mich. Iowa Non-qualifier JC
6. Dwayne Bryant B New Orleans Georgetown Qualifier -
7. Fess Irvin B Gonzales, La. LSU Qualifier -
8. Scott Williams B Hacienda, Calif. N. Carolina Qualifier -
9. Larry Rembert B Orrville, Ala. Alabama-Birm. Qualifier
10. Sylvester Gray B Arlington, Tenn. Memphis St. Non-qualifier 3 yrs.
11. Derrick Coleman B Detroit Syracuse Qualifier -
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The ACC consists of Clemson, Duke, Georgia Tech., Maryland,
North Carolina, North Carolina State, Virginia and Wake Forest. Id.
178. Id. The Big Sky Conference consists of the following institutions: Boise
State, Idaho State, Idaho, Montana, Montana State, Nevada-Reno, Northern Ari-




























































































Given these statistics, traditionally black institutions could make
an even stronger argument at the next NCAA convention in favor
of amending the Bylaw. 186 The statistics could possibly persuade
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already receptive delegates.187 The amendment would either exempt
those black institutions in part or in whole. '88 It would also meet
any objections about invasions of automony. 8 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, the passage of the Bylaw has signaled a new era in the
proud heritage of the NCAA. True, the Bylaw has had a dispropor-
tionate impact on minorities-an impact that the next convention
must address.1 90 However, given the rampant cheating and exploita-
tion throughout our universities and colleges, it is about time that
the NCAA shed its blinders. Unfortunately, the enactment of the
Bylaw is a sad commentary on the present state of college athletics.
187. See NCAA Proceedings (1983). As Father Joyce of Notre Dame stated:
(black universities) It is not within this latter group of institutions that rampant
abuses have taken place or where the reform of the exploitative system is
needed too badly. Indeed, from a personal point of view, I would like to see
these schools exempted from legislation that violates their sense of fairness.
Id. at 124.
Mr. Witte added:
Then we will be precluded from considering amendments that I find more
realistic in terms of the debate today. It seems to me that what we have boiled
this down to an issue over the validity of the test scores. It is true, as Father
Joyce says, that no one has a discriminatory intent; but it is unquestioned
that there will be an enormous discriminatory effect. All of the statistics reveal
that. It seems to me then, that since we have in mind a formula which is of
an extremely dubious validity and which no one has in fact spoken in favor
of today or shown its validity or legitimacy as a method of depriving persons




189. Id. Father Joyce said "I think, too, that it is most distressing and
unfortunate that the debate gives the impression that predominantly white colleges
are interfering with the internal educational policies of some splendid black insti-
tutions."
190. The Bylaw will also have a positive impact on Division II schools in that
it will enable those institutions to retain more quality athletes who might have gone
on to play at the Division I level if not for the Bylaw. Id. at 113. Bob Moorman
of the Central Intercollegiate Athletic Association stated:
This would be great for Division II and for the black schools in Division II.
We would get some of our athletes back. I have said this before on this floor.
I was in a basketball tournament about three years ago; and the athletic
director for a southern institution said to me, "I have not seen this many
whites playing basketball all year." So we are going to get some athletes back,
maybe. Id. at 113.
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Should the institution of higher learning really need a rule to stop
themselves from exploiting college athletes? 191
I don't know which is my best team. I will find out who my best
team is when I find out how many doctors, lawyers and good husbands
and good citizens have come off every one of those teams. 192
Knute Rockne
191. As Moorman stated:
[I]t disturbs me when someone gets up and says they want to have something
to stop exploitation. Do you need a rule to stop it? You do not have to
exploit them (athletes). You do not need a rule to exploit them. I know for
a fact that there are lots of institutions in the NCAA that are not abiding
by-and I am talking about Division I-the 2.000 now. They work every
means of getting a joker in who does not know two and two. SO now you
are going to get a rule that someone is going to break again. Let us get
something more realistic.
192. Id. at 115.
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